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Major General John D. Altenburg, Jr.
The author asserts that three major Executive branch mistakes in 2001 and 
2002 created the conditions for misunderstanding of international humani-
tarian law and the authority of the military to capture and detain unprivi-
leged belligerents and conduct military commissions. His experience as a 
career Army Judge Advocate and as the Convening Authority for Military 
Commissions provides him with a unique perspective.  He discusses early 
Presidential decisions that undermined the good will of the international 
community, generating critical reaction that forced the administration to 
respond constantly to debates regarding domestic criminal law standards.  
Rather, the administration should have engaged in meaningful discussions 
of appropriate responses to non-state actors waging war and the appropri-
ate application of international humanitarian law standards.  The author 
concludes that the administration’s arrogance and naïveté led to these 
mistakes.
Three mistakes by the previous administration in the last quarter of 
2001 laid the foundation for criticism that has persisted since that time. 
Some of the criticism is well-founded; some has been disingenuous. A sig-
nificant result of these mistakes has been inaccurate information communi-
cated to the public.
The first mistake was the failure to pursue active public diplomacy 
and education regarding international humanitarian law. The second mistake 
was failure to conduct Third Geneva Convention Article 5 tribunals in Afg-
hanistan and the concomitant decision to send large numbers of hastily-
screened detainees out of theater; and the third mistake was the failure to 
design and implement, at an appropriate juncture, twenty-first century mili-
tary commissions.
The current administration is at precisely the same crossroad in 
2009. Decisions regarding combat operations, detention policy, detention 
location, and the nature of twenty-first century war crimes trial venues, in-
cluding military commissions, face the administration in September 2009. It 
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is important to analyze the events of 2001 in order to inform critical deci-
sions and policies in 2009. 
Criticism of the President’s 2001 Military Order1 and later the 2006 
Military Commission Act2 (MCA) as a forum for trying alleged war crimes 
by members and supporters of al-Qaeda has focused precisely on the feature 
that makes military commissions useful: the rules and procedures that differ 
from U.S. domestic criminal trial practice procedures. These differences are 
lawful and consistent with international legal standards, even though some 
may consider them ill-advised for policy reasons. While it is true that mili-
tary commissions have, historically and as a matter of custom, substantially 
employed the procedural and evidentiary rules applicable at the time to 
courts-martial, there always have been modifications. The best and most 
recent example is the military commission as employed in the 1940s, when 
the courts-martial rules were modified for commissions to allow hearsay, 
closed sessions, and to provide finality through prompt review, but no ap-
peal.3 That exception to pre-existing custom, in the wake of the MCA, re-
tains vitality as manifest in the statutory mandate4
The commission is simply an instrumentality for the more efficient execu-
tion of the war powers vested in Congress and the power vested in the 
President as the Commander-in-chief in war. In some instances . . . Con-
gress has specifically recognized the commission as the proper war-court, 
and in terms provided for the trial thereby of certain offenses. In general, 
however, it has left to the President, and the military commanders 
representing him, to employ the commission, as occasion may require, for 
the investigation and punishment of the laws of war and other offences not 
cognizable by court-martial.
to employ other proce-
dures and rules of evidence. 
5
While opinions vary on the vitality of the trials being conducted at 
Guantánamo Bay, most would likely agree that the limited public accep-
tance by some sectors of the press, public, and academy in the U.S. and 
1 Military Order No. 222, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the 
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).  
2 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
3 See COMM. OF ARMED SERVICES, AMENDING THE ARTICLES OF WAR TO IMPROVE THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE, H.R. REP. NO. 80-1034, at 17–22 (1947), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/amend_articles.pdf. See also Military Order of 
July 2, 1942, 3 C.F.R. 1308 (1938–1943); Proclamation No. 2561, 3 C.F.R. 309 (1938–
1943); Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sustein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a 
Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT 261, 274–76 (2002) (discussing the 
similarities between President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s military commissions in the 
1940s to President Bush’s military commissions).  
4 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
5 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 831 (1920).  
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abroad of military commissions as a forum for trial of al-Qaeda and asso-
ciated non-state actors is the result of a series of complex policy decisions 
and attitudes. Policies change with the stroke of a pen, but attitudes and 
public opinion frequently harden; the adage that “there’s no second chance 
to make a first impression” applies with devastating force. 
Discussions of the utility of military commissions as an appropriate 
trial forum frequently find participants already polarized. Without suggest-
ing that any specific policy, practice, or event created this polarization, it 
seems fair to conclude that a combination of secrecy and exertion of unitary 
executive power did much not only to prevent the education of the public 
regarding wartime legal procedures available to the government, but also to 
reduce proponents of military commissions to sporadic and ineffectual 
counter punching. In hindsight, the (perhaps) well-intended secrecy that 
surrounded the formulation and piecemeal implementation of military 
commissions also served, whether intended or not, to encourage ignorance, 
both in the public and the press, regarding the history and diversity of mili-
tary tribunals generally, and the role of wartime military commissions spe-
cifically. This secrecy fostered skepticism and ill will; it produced a public 
perception of the military commissions’ legitimacy as being defined by 
those who opposed them, evaluated not as a flexible, historically based, and 
evolving UCMJ6
The U.S. is at war with al-Qaeda and Taliban members who support
it. When the war began is a point worth discussing. Some argue that it be-
gan in 1993 when al-Qaeda operatives bombed the World Trade Center in 
New York City. This event is now characterized as World Trade Center I. 
Others argue that it began in 1996 when Osama bin Laden declared war on 
the U.S. or in 1998 when he repeated the declaration and specified that his 
operatives should target and kill American civilians worldwide. Nearly all 
would agree that bombing two U.S. embassies in western Africa in 1998 or
attacking a U.S. warship in 2000 qualify as wartime actions. There should 
be no doubt that the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York 
City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. ensured a state of war between 
al-Qaeda and the U.S. But there are some who claim that because al-Qaeda 
is a non-state actor all the events discussed above amount to mere criminal 
activity that should be prosecuted with the domestic criminal law system.
authorized war crimes trial forum, but rather as an un-
tested shortcut to convictions, hopelessly intermeshed with detainee policy.
7
6 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006).  
7 See, e.g., Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commis-
sions and the Exercise of Presidential Power, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 648, 725–27 (2001) 
(cautioning against removing the Afghanistan detainees from the mainstream criminal law 
system because of prior precedent treating both foreign and domestic terrorists like common 
criminals). 
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The problem of determining when the war will end or how we will 
be able to tell when the war ends is worthy of a different discussion and 
debate, but it does not alter the fact that we are currently at war. For the first 
time in history, organizations of non-state actors are capable of mounting 
offensive military operations worldwide, have more military capability than 
half the nations of the world community, and possess economic clout which 
matches or exceeds that of more than half the countries of the world. They 
are “state-like” in only these three aspects, but these aspects are critical to 
the national security of all nations. This is a thorny issue, but we should not 
conclude that the U.S. cannot be at war because we cannot articulate how or 
when we will be able to tell the war is concluded. It is important to note that
all security organizations to which the U.S. belongs invoked their self-
defense clauses in the fall of 2001 after the 9/11 attacks; such unprecedent-
ed action was not taken for law enforcement purposes.
What is worthy of discussion and debate is how to conduct the war, 
how to detain combatants, what interrogation methods to employ, and if, 
how, and when to prosecute those who are believed to have committed vi-
olations of the law of armed conflict. The terms of the discussion should be 
within the framework of war principles, not law enforcement principles. A 
nation may choose to prosecute certain offenders as criminals and employ 
our domestic criminal justice system. But combatants captured by allied 
forces mayand shouldbe detained and interrogated, if capturing powers 
choose to question them within the principles of the law of armed conflict. 
Decisions regarding whether, when, and where to prosecute those who vi-
olated the law of armed conflict should be made within the same principles. 
There are many issues to discuss in connection with the ongoing 
conflict, but we are at least eight years into the war and have little consensus 
on several important questions. The main reason for the current confusion is 
the singular inability of the U.S. administration in 2001 to communicate to 
its citizens and to the rest of the world the nature of the conflictother than 
sweeping blandishments about the “global war on terror.” The failure to 
engage in public education and public diplomacy regarding unique aspects 
of the law of armed conflict, like the right to detain until the war ends, 
allowed critics to frame the terms of debate. Such efforts by organizations 
and individuals are legitimate, but left unchallenged they may confuse the 
public. 
Non-government agencies naturally seek opportunities to advocate 
for their beliefs, whether it is to modify the law of armed conflict itself, to 
define anew which weapons systems and ammunition types are legitimate, 
or to define terms and concepts; for example, the appropriate designation of 
“child soldier.” When government representatives abdicate their responsi-
bility to counter such claims, the public is left to conclude that the law is
what critics describe. In fact, frequently what critics persuade the public is
the law is what critics would like for the law to become. A simple example 
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is that of defining “child soldier.” No doubt numerous organizations and 
individuals would like for persons less than eighteen years old or less than 
sixteen years old to be considered “child soldiers.” Perhaps someday inter-
national law will change to make it so. But the law is that “child soldier” is 
someone less than the age of fifteen.8
The terms of debate regarding detention issues at Guantánamo Bay 
in 2002 quickly became defined in the context of domestic criminal law. 
The U.S. government failed to discuss publicly the universal and time-
honored basis for detaining al-Qaeda and Taliban supporters captured in 
Afghanistan and transferred to Guantánamo. Not one administration official 
compared al-Qaeda detention to the more than 400,000 German and Italian 
detainees who were in prison camps located in all forty-eight of the U.S. 
states in 1944. None of those World War II detainees demanded lawyers or 
trials; they understood the law of armed conflict and that the detaining pow-
er (the U.S.) was justified in detaining them until the war ended. In fact, 
many detainees in 1944 could have argued that they were merely vehicle 
drivers, cooks, or typists; they had not taken up arms against the allies. Most 
were conscripted by their respective governments; they had not voluntarily 
become part of the military force. But the law of armed conflict was clear; 
all could be detained until the war ended, no matter how long that might be. 
Yet no U.S. official in 2001 or 2002 drew this obvious comparison to help 
the public understand the basis for detaining al-Qaeda operatives and sup-
porters. Even allowing for the difference between Prisoner of War status 
for most World War II detainees and the unlawful combatant status of to-
day’s detainees, the public would have been served well by a better effort 
from the administration to inform them of the wartime principles supporting 
detention.
Wishing it to be otherwise or advocat-
ing it to be otherwise may be a laudable goal, but the lack of comment by 
others has led many to believe that a fifteen year-old is a child soldier. It is 
true that conscripting such young people is prohibited, but even then there is 
no bar to holding them accountable for their actions.
More significantly, not one administration official in 2002 spoke 
publicly to compare the U.S. government’s position during the 1960s and 
70s, when several hundred U.S. military personnel were detained by North 
Vietnam. North Vietnam was not a signatory to the Geneva Conventions 
and claimed that the detainees were war criminals, but took no steps to ad-
judicate these claims and did not follow the rudiments of international law 
in its humanitarian or legal treatment of captured U.S. personnel. Still, the 
U.S. never demanded their return, did not demand lawyers to represent 
8 See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8.2(b)(xxvi), July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (“‘[W]ar crimes’ means . . . conscripting or enlisting children under 
the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities.”).  
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them, and did not demand that they be prosecuted or released. Rather, the 
U.S. government, through both Democratic and Republican administrations, 
stated that it expected North Vietnam to treat the detainees with respect and 
to return them to the U.S. when the war ended. In 1968 and 1969 few im-
agined that the war would end in 1973 for U.S. detainees. The nature of war 
is that its end is difficult to predict. Those who claim we are not at war be-
cause we cannot articulate how we will define its end ignore the reality and 
history of war to make their point. 
Had the U.S. administration articulated forcefully in 2001 or 2002 
that the law of armed conflict gives us the legal right to detain until the war 
ends those captured on the battlefield, then we might sooner have had a 
more focused debate regarding detention policy, whether to prosecute al-
leged war criminals sooner or later, and what forum to use once the decision 
to prosecute was made. The arrogance of the administration, evidenced by 
ignoring its obligation to educate and inform the public, combined with 
critics who advocated not the existing law but the law as they would wish it 
to be, created confusion that continues to this day. This failure of public 
discourse by the government, combined with two other errors in judgment 
mentioned above, led to mounting criticism of U.S. government policy once 
the public adjusted to the shock of September 2001.
The most troubling and obvious error was the decision not to con-
duct Third Geneva Convention Article 5 tribunals in Afghanistan. It was not 
necessary to conduct such tribunals for all detainees, but for the administra-
tion to conclude that there was “no doubt” as to the status of not only al-
Qaeda operatives, but also all Taliban members and others captured was to 
ignore the purpose and importance of Article 5 tribunals while also failing 
to appreciate the advantage of conducting such tribunals.9
9 See generally Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and Wil-
liam J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf.
The decision not 
to conduct Article 5 tribunals was made in the face of unanimous opposition 
from all uniformed attorneys (judge advocates) at every level of command. 
Judge advocates are inclined to conduct Article 5 tribunals even when not 
strictly required because they serve as an institutional safeguard for deten-
tion operations. Three commissioned officers, at least one of whom is a 
judge advocate officer, objectively reviewing the facts and circumstances of 
the detainee’s capture and detention, provide a significant internal control 
measure for detention operations. At such hearings, the detainee is able to 
describe personally his perspective on capture and detention and to provide 
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information supporting his release or a detention category other than “un-
lawful combatant.”10 If necessary, interpreters are provided.11
Conducting Article 5 tribunals in Afghanistan would have produced 
two significant benefits and no countervailing disadvantages. First, the me-
chanism itself would have revealed early not only possible intelligence fail-
ures but also any mistakes in point of capture operations and subsequent 
detention operations. Second, Article 5 tribunals would have reinforced the 
legitimacy of the detention regime in the eyes of the American public, world 
opinion, and most importantly, the Supreme Court. Recall that Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion in the Hamdi12
The other major error was the decision to pattern the November 13, 
2001 Presidential Military Order (PMO)
decision, while acknowledging that the 
U.S. was at war, strongly “advised” the government that tribunals to deter-
mine the appropriate status of the detainees would be important. Her thinly 
veiled reference to Geneva Convention Article 5 tribunals led directly to the 
establishment of the Combat Status Review Tribunal (CSRT). Unfortunate-
ly, by 2004 critics, because of the described failure of public education, 
were already in full domestic criminal law mode and commenced to critic-
ize the CSRT process because of perceived inadequacies when compared to 
domestic criminal process. Ironically, the Guantánamo detainees have been 
afforded the most extensive review procedures in the history of armed con-
flict. The CSRT process went far beyond that mandated by the Geneva 
Conventions. The U.S. went even further in establishing annual Administra-
tive Review Boards, an absolutely unprecedented mechanism not required 
by international law. Yet because the terms of the debate remain domestic 
criminal law, much of the public believes that the detainees must be re-
leased and that Guantánamo must be closed.
13
10 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian 
Internees and Other Detainees, Army Regulation 190–8, ch. 1, § 1–6 (1997), available at 
http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r190_8.pdf (stating that “if any doubt arises” as to a 
person’s classification, “such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention 
until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal” and a tribunal 
should determine the status of any person “not appearing to be entitled to prisoner of war 
status” who “asserts that he or she is entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war . . . .”) [herei-
nafter Enemy Prisoners of War].
so literally after the 1942 Presi-
11 Enemy Prisoners of War, supra note 10, §1–6 e(5) (“Persons whose status is to be de-
termined shall be allowed to attend all open sessions and will be provided with an interpreter 
if necessary.”).  
12 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (“Indeed, it is notable that military regu-
lations already provide for such process in related instances, dictating that tribunals be made 
available to determine the status of enemy detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status under 
the Geneva Convention.”).
13 Military Order No. 222, supra note 1.  
18 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:11
dential Military Order establishing a military commission to prosecute al-
leged Nazi saboteurs.14 The 1942 Presidential Military Order and subse-
quent trial had been affirmed 8-0 by the Supreme Court,15 but the 1942 or-
der was based on the 1920 Articles of War, which were amended by the 
1948 Articles of War and then superseded by the 1950 Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ).16 The UCMJ was subsequently amended signifi-
cantly in 1968 and 1983.17
Had government attorneys considered the development of military 
law, they would not have insisted upon “creating” an ad hoc military com-
mission process. Article 21 of the UCMJ provides ample legislative authori-
ty for the executive to conduct military commissions.
The PMO drafters simply failed to consider 
the effect of the preceding sixty years of jurisprudential developments in 
military law.
18 Article 36 of the 
UCMJ provides additional authority to modify commission procedures, if 
necessary.19 Using the UCMJ and the current Manual for Courts-martial 
(MCM)20
Actually, such a methodology was adopted by the Office of Military 
Commissions (OMC) in late 2004 as individuals within the executive 
branch debated differences among administration officials about detention 
policy and military commission procedures. OMC attorneys worked from 
as a starting point, attorneys could have analyzed MCM provi-
sions to determine if they were practicable in twenty-first century military 
commission trials of non-state actor unlawful combatants who had allegedly 
violated the law of armed conflict. Where the court-martial provision was
adequate, it could be adopted by the commission process. Where the court-
martial provision was considered impracticable, the commission process 
could be modified and an analysis provided in the developing “Manual for 
Military Commissions.” Many believe that had such a methodology been 
followed, then the critics of military commissions would have had much 
less to discuss—even if they continued to be preoccupied with domestic 
criminal law procedures for non-citizen alien unlawful combatants. 
14 Military Order of July 2, 1942, 3 C.F.R. 1308 (1938–1943).
15 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).   
16 Military Legal Resources History of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, http://www.
loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/UCMJ_LHP.html; H.R. REP. NO. 80-1034, at 1 (1947); 95 
CONG. REC. 4120, at 1–2 (1949).
17 Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968); The Military 
Justice Act of 1983: Hearing on S. 974 Before the Military Personnel and Compensation 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives,
98th Cong. 9 (1983).
18 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006).
19 Id. § 836(a).
20 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (2008 ed.), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/
pdf/MCM-2008.pdf.
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October 2004 throughout 2005 and well into 2006 to develop a Manual for 
Military Commissions (MMC) and a proposed UCMJ amendment (Article 
135(a)). If adopted, these documents would have concisely updated UCMJ 
military commission procedures to account for legislative and jurispruden-
tial changes since 1948. Unfortunately, decision makers did not share the 
enthusiasm of a group of Defense Department, National Security Council, 
State Department, and Justice Department officials who urged the adoption 
of proposed Article 135a and the proposed Manual for Military Commis-
sions.21 Once the Supreme Court decided Hamdan,22 then Congress seized 
the initiative and subsequently passed the Military Commission Act of 
2006,23
Three mistakes in the early twenty-first century spread misinforma-
tion, created critics, and strengthened existing critics. We live now with the 
effects of those missteps. But the war continues; national security remains at 
risk. Our reputation is damaged and the balancing must continue. How do 
we achieve what has always been a challenging wartime balance? We must 
protect our national security while upholding the rule of law. We did not do 
that very well from 2001 to 2006. Perhaps in 2009, with a different adminis-
tration in Washington, D.C., there can be the discussion and constructive 
debates that should have occurred seven years ago. Discussion and debate 
today should focus on the issues as they relate to the war paradigm in the 
twenty-first century in the wake of several Supreme Court decisions. These 
decisions acknowledge the fact that the U.S. is at war. Given that, how do 
we reconcile national security interests and the rule of law? What is the way 
forward? 
which is fraught with its own inconsistencies and inadequacies.
21 See Statement by Major General John D. Altenburg, Jr. Before the Committee of Armed 
Forces, at 3–4 (July 7, 2009), available at http://law.case.edu/lectures/files/2009-
2010/20090911_1-AltenburgTestimonySASC-09.7.7.pdf. 
22 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
23 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
